Inspiration from physics for thinking about economics, finance and social systems
Wednesday, March 5, 2014
Physics of Finance: Medium collection
I've started what is called a collection over at Medium.com. The collection's name is the same as this blog. To follow content added to the collection, go here and click the link. This IS an experiment, so I'm not sure where it will go, but this is how we learn, we hope. At Medium, anyone can submit a story to a collection and the collection editor acts as the curator. In time I hope it won't be just me writing there.
Economists' "just so" stories...
A "just so" story is one that gives a nice comforting but ultimately fantastic explanation for some puzzling and unexplained thing. Rudyard Kipling of course made the idea famous in his book of that name. The Leopard's spots, in his story, were originally painted on by an Ethiopian, after that Ethiopian had first painted himself black.
Modern economists have picked up the ball and now, with their sophisticated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models, tell similar just so stories to explain (after the fact, of course) how economies work. It's all comes down to a lot of infinite forward thinking, rational optimization and equilibrium. I do wonder in fact if there is anything that could conceivable happen in an economy that DSGE modellers wouldn't be able to "explain" after sufficient work. Indeed, that would be an interesting exercise for DSGE lovers: can you make a short list of economic happenings that would clearly be inconsistent with your theories?
On a related matter, I think there is something very fishy about economists' defense of DSGE models as being useful for "telling stories." I've heard this excuse several times recently. No, they may not find much empirical support, and no, they're not much good for prediction, and no again, no one on Wall St. uses them in making practical investment decisions. BUT STILL -- these things are really very useful because they let us tell stories about how the economy works. That to me smells rotten.
I've written an essay on these "just so" stories over at Medium.com. I'm experimenting with writing over there a little, and will continue exploring themes relevant to The Physics of Finance. I'll always put a link here so anyone interested can go through.
Make banks less risky with a tax -- one they don't have to pay
I wrote recently in Bloomberg about a really cool proposal to introduce a new kind of tax on financial transactions. The tax would be specifically linked to how much systemic risk a transaction -- say a loan from one bank to another -- creates. It's easy to roll your eyes when you hear about transaction taxes, thinking A. it will never happen and B. it might not do much good even if it did. There are real reasons to believe that a transaction tax might damage market liquidity. But the thing I'm writing about here is VERY different.
This is a tax institutions DON'T HAVE TO PAY. Institutions that work hard to borrow and lend in a way that doesn't increase risk to the overall financial system (by piling up debt on particular institutions, for example) would end up paying no tax. The idea is to bring systemic risk into the pricing system so institutions have an incentive to avoid it. In so doing, you provide a mechanism for the entire financial network to reconfigure itself to have lower systemic risk. The paper I'm writing about proposes a concrete method to do this, although it would in practice require giving central banks more information on financial transactions of many kinds.
This is the kind of really creative thinking we need a lot more of. Read more here.
Labels:
new ideas,
self organization,
systemic risk,
transaction tax
Thursday, February 20, 2014
Why we do things... John Kay
Not everything we do, not even most of it, is done for profit, or with other practical aims in mind. John Kay:
In 1969 Robert Wilson, director of the National Accelerator Laboratory, was testifying before the US Congress. He sought funding for a particle accelerator (forerunner of the Large Hadron Collider at Cern where the Higgs boson was discovered in 2012). Asked by Senator John Pastore how his project would help defeat the Russians, he responded: “It only has to do with the respect with which we regard one another . . . are we good painters, good sculptors, great poets . . . new knowledge has nothing to do directly with defending our country except to help make it worth defending.”
Friday, February 14, 2014
Mike Woodford: why we need to model expectations realistically
I just read an essay by Mike Woodford from 2012, and I thought I might pass on a few interesting observations he made. He was responding to a criticism of rational expectations based DSGE modelling made by John Kay. What he says seems to make quite a bit of sense to me, especially about the need to model how people form expectations in a realistic way, going beyond the naive assumption of rational expectations, looking to empirical evidence instead (those comments come toward the end):
"There is... an important respect in which I do believe that much model-based economic
analysis imposes a requirement of internal consistency that is unduly strong, and that may result in unnecessary fragility of the conclusions reached; and I suspect that this has a fair amount to do with the unease that Kay expresses about modern economic analysis. It has been standard for at least the past three decades to use models in which not only does the model give a complete description of a hypothetical world, and not only is this description one in which outcomes follow from rational behavior on the part of the decision-makers in the model, but the decision-makers in the model are assumed to understand the world in exactly the way it is represented in the model.
This postulate of “rational expectations,” as it is commonly though rather misleadingly known, is the crucial theoretical assumption behind such doctrines as “efficient markets” in asset pricing theory and “Ricardian equivalence” in macroeconomics. It is often presented as if it were a simple consequence of an aspiration to internal consistency in one’s model and/or explanation of people’s choices in terms of individual rationality, but in fact it is not a necessary implication of these methodological commitments. It does not follow from the fact that one believes in the validity of one’s own model and that one believes that people can be assumed to make rational choices that they must be assumed to make the choices that would be seen to be correct by someone who (like the economist) believes in the validity of the predictions of that model. Still less would it follow, if the economist herself accepts the necessity of entertaining the possibility of a variety of possible models, that the only models that she should consider are ones in each of which everyone in the economy is assumed to understand the correctness of that particular model, rather than entertaining beliefs that might (for example) be consistent with one of the other models in the set that she herself regards as possibly correct."
"...the mainstream alternative developed in response to [the Lucas] critique --- according to which aggregate consumer expenditure is modeled as the solution to the Euler equation (a condition for intertemporal optimality) of a representative household, under the hypothesis of rational expectations, has difficulty matching the statistical properties of aggregate data too closely. In order to avoid making strongly counter-factual predictions, current-vintage empirical DSGE models commonly assume preferences for the representative household that incorporate a high degree of “habit persistence,” so that even when solved under the assumption of intertemporal optimization under rational expectations, consumer spending will not jump sharply in response to events that (at least according to the model) should predictably change the future path of household income. But the postulate of strong habit persistence has not found much support from studies of the behavior of individual households. An alternative explanation for the observation of persistent departures from the predictions of the rational expectations Euler-equation model under more standard preferences would be the existence of persistent departures of actual household expectations from those implied by the rational-expectations solution of the economists’ model."
"The macroeconomics of the future, I believe, will... have to go beyond conventional late-twentieth-century methodology as well, by making the formation and revision of expectations an object of analysis in its own right... A prudent use of such an approach for economic policy analysis would surely need to consider a variety of possible assumptions about the forecasting approaches used by economic agents, quite apart from the consideration that would be given to uncertainty about the correct specification of the economic environment.
This absence of a single clear prediction about how people should forecast is often considered to be a reason not to entertain such hypotheses, and instead to prefer the hypothesis of rational expectations, which aims to provide a unique prediction about expectations in a given economic environment. But a more sensible approach may be to accept that one should only expect one’s model of the economy to deliver a range of plausible outcomes, rather than a unique prediction...
Allowance for a set of possible outcomes under a given policy would lead to an approach to policy design that would focus on the robustness of policy to possible variations in the way that the consequences of the policy are understood by people in the economy, rather than focusing solely on the optimality of the policy if events unfold precisely as planned. It should lead, for example, to a concern to design policies that make it more difficult for asset bubbles to occur, or that should reduce the economic distortions that result from them when they do occur, rather than ignoring these issues on the ground that in a rational-expectations equilibrium the bubbles should not occur. It should also lead to greater attention to the communication policies of central banks and other governmental actors, rather than assuming that official explanations of policy are irrelevant given that economic agents can be expected to have rational expectations --- and that these “rational” expectations depend only on governmental actions, not upon speech."
"... What we should outgrow... is the aspiration to build models that can not only be regarded (at least provisionally) as correct representations of reality for purposes of policy analysis, but that can be assumed to be self-evidently valid to everyone in the economy as well."
From "What’s Wrong with Economic Models?", Michael Woodford, July 2012
http://ineteconomics.org/sites/inet.civicactions.net/files/Note-9-Woodford.pdf
Is inequality approaching a tipping point?
As with my last post, I'm trying to catch up here in linking to my recent Bloomberg pieces. This is my last one from two weeks ago. Given all the recent discussion of rising inequality, I wanted to point to a really fascinating paper from about 15 years ago that almost no one (in economics, at least) seems to know about. The paper looks at a very general model of how wealth flows around in an economy, and points to the existence of a surprising phase transition or tipping point in how wealth ends up being distributed. It shows that, beyond a certain threshold (see text below), the usual effect of wealth concentration (a small fraction of people owning a significant fraction of all wealth) becomes much worse: wealth "condenses" into the hands of just a few individuals (or, in the model, they might also be firms), not merely into the hands of a small fraction of the population.
Are we approaching such a point? I've mentioned some evidence in the article that we might be. But the important thing, I believe, is that we have good reason to expect that such a threshold really does exist. We are likely getting closer to it, although we may still have a ways to go.
****
We know that inequality is on the rise around the world: The richest 1 percent command almost half the planet’s household wealth, while the poorest half have less than 1 percent. We know a lot less about why this is happening, and where it might lead.
Some argue that technological advancement drives income disproportionately to those with the right knowledge and skills. Others point to the explosive growth in the financial sector. Liberals worry that extreme inequality will tear society apart. Conservatives argue that the wealth of the rich inspires others to succeed.
What if we could shed all our political prejudices and take a more scientific approach, setting up an experimental world where we could test our thinking about what drives inequality? Crazy as the idea might sound, it has actually been done. The results are worth pondering.
Imagine a world like our own, only greatly simplified. Everyone has equal talent and starts out with the same wealth. Each person can gain or lose wealth by interacting and exchanging goods and services with others, or by making investments that earn uncertain returns over time.
More than a decade ago some scientists set up such a world, in a computer, and used it to run simulations examining fundamental aspects of wealth dynamics. They found several surprising things.
First, inequality was unavoidable: A small fraction of individuals (say 20 percent) always came to possess a large fraction (say 80 percent) of the total wealth. This happened because some individuals were luckier than others. By chance alone, some peoples’ investments paid off many times in a row. The more wealth they had, the more they could invest, making bigger future gains even more likely.
For those who worry about the corrosive effects of wealth inequality on social cohesion and democracy, the idea that it follows almost inexorably from the most basic features of modern economies might be unnerving. But there it is. A small fraction owning most of everything is just as natural as having mountains on a planet with plate tectonics.
Suppose we reach into this experimental world and, by adjusting tax incentives or other means, boost the role of financial investment relative to simple economic exchange. What happens then? The distribution of wealth becomes more unequal: The wealth share of the top 20 percent goes from, say, 80 percent to 90 percent.
If you keep boosting the role of finance and investment, something surprising happens. Inequality doesn’t just keep growing in a gradual and continuous way. Rather, the economy crosses an abrupt tipping point. Suddenly, a few individuals end up owning everything.
This would be a profoundly different world. It’s one thing to have much of the wealth belonging to a small fraction of the population -- 1 percent is still about 70 million people. It’s entirely another if a small number of people -- say, five or eight -- hold most of the wealth. With such a chasm between the poor and rich, the idea that a person could go from one group to the other in a lifetime, or even in a number of generations, becomes absurd. The sheer numbers make the probability vanishingly small.
Are we headed toward such a world? Well, data from Bloomberg and the bank Credit Suisse suggest that the planet’s 138 richest people currently command more wealth than the roughly 3.5 billion who make up the poorest half of the population. Of course, nobody can say whether that means we’ve reached a tipping point or are nearing one.
Experimental worlds are useful in that they exploit the power of computation to examine the likely consequences of complex interactions that would otherwise overwhelm our analytical skills. We can get at least a little insight into what might happen, what we ought to expect.
Our experimental world suggests that today’s vast wealth inequality probably isn’t the result of any economic conspiracy, or of vast differences in human skills. It’s more likely the banal outcome of a fairly mechanical process -- one that, unless we find some way to alter its course, could easily carry us into a place where most of us would rather not be.
Are we approaching such a point? I've mentioned some evidence in the article that we might be. But the important thing, I believe, is that we have good reason to expect that such a threshold really does exist. We are likely getting closer to it, although we may still have a ways to go.
****
We know that inequality is on the rise around the world: The richest 1 percent command almost half the planet’s household wealth, while the poorest half have less than 1 percent. We know a lot less about why this is happening, and where it might lead.
Some argue that technological advancement drives income disproportionately to those with the right knowledge and skills. Others point to the explosive growth in the financial sector. Liberals worry that extreme inequality will tear society apart. Conservatives argue that the wealth of the rich inspires others to succeed.
What if we could shed all our political prejudices and take a more scientific approach, setting up an experimental world where we could test our thinking about what drives inequality? Crazy as the idea might sound, it has actually been done. The results are worth pondering.
Imagine a world like our own, only greatly simplified. Everyone has equal talent and starts out with the same wealth. Each person can gain or lose wealth by interacting and exchanging goods and services with others, or by making investments that earn uncertain returns over time.
More than a decade ago some scientists set up such a world, in a computer, and used it to run simulations examining fundamental aspects of wealth dynamics. They found several surprising things.
First, inequality was unavoidable: A small fraction of individuals (say 20 percent) always came to possess a large fraction (say 80 percent) of the total wealth. This happened because some individuals were luckier than others. By chance alone, some peoples’ investments paid off many times in a row. The more wealth they had, the more they could invest, making bigger future gains even more likely.
For those who worry about the corrosive effects of wealth inequality on social cohesion and democracy, the idea that it follows almost inexorably from the most basic features of modern economies might be unnerving. But there it is. A small fraction owning most of everything is just as natural as having mountains on a planet with plate tectonics.
Suppose we reach into this experimental world and, by adjusting tax incentives or other means, boost the role of financial investment relative to simple economic exchange. What happens then? The distribution of wealth becomes more unequal: The wealth share of the top 20 percent goes from, say, 80 percent to 90 percent.
If you keep boosting the role of finance and investment, something surprising happens. Inequality doesn’t just keep growing in a gradual and continuous way. Rather, the economy crosses an abrupt tipping point. Suddenly, a few individuals end up owning everything.
This would be a profoundly different world. It’s one thing to have much of the wealth belonging to a small fraction of the population -- 1 percent is still about 70 million people. It’s entirely another if a small number of people -- say, five or eight -- hold most of the wealth. With such a chasm between the poor and rich, the idea that a person could go from one group to the other in a lifetime, or even in a number of generations, becomes absurd. The sheer numbers make the probability vanishingly small.
Are we headed toward such a world? Well, data from Bloomberg and the bank Credit Suisse suggest that the planet’s 138 richest people currently command more wealth than the roughly 3.5 billion who make up the poorest half of the population. Of course, nobody can say whether that means we’ve reached a tipping point or are nearing one.
Experimental worlds are useful in that they exploit the power of computation to examine the likely consequences of complex interactions that would otherwise overwhelm our analytical skills. We can get at least a little insight into what might happen, what we ought to expect.
Our experimental world suggests that today’s vast wealth inequality probably isn’t the result of any economic conspiracy, or of vast differences in human skills. It’s more likely the banal outcome of a fairly mechanical process -- one that, unless we find some way to alter its course, could easily carry us into a place where most of us would rather not be.
Wall St shorts economists
I've been remiss in not providing links to my last two Bloomberg pieces. Active web surfers may have run across them, but if not -- below is the full text of this essay from January. It looks at the question -- first raised here by Noah Smith -- of why, if DSGE models are so useful for understanding an economy, i.e. for gaining insights which can be had in no other way, no one on Wall St. actually seems to use them. Good question, I think:
****
In 1986, when the space shuttle Challenger exploded 73 seconds after takeoff, investors immediately dumped the stock of manufacturer Morton Thiokol Inc., which made the O-rings that were eventually blamed for the disaster. With extraordinary wisdom, the global market had quickly rendered a verdict on what happened and why.
Economists often remind us that markets, by pooling information from diverse sources, do a wonderful job of valuing companies, ideas and inventions. So what does the market think about economic theory itself? The answer ought to be rather disconcerting.
Blogger Noah Smith recently did an informal survey to find out if financial firms actually use the “dynamic stochastic general equilibrium” models that encapsulate the dominant thinking about how the economy works. The result? Some do pay a little attention, because they want to predict the actions of central banks that use the models. In their investing, however, very few Wall Street firms find the DSGE models useful.
I heard pretty much the same story in recent meetings with 15 or so leaders of large London investment firms. None thought that the DSGE models offered insight into the workings of the economy.
This should come as no surprise to anyone who has looked closely at the models. Can an economy of hundreds of millions of individuals and tens of thousands of different firms be distilled into just one household and one firm, which rationally optimize their risk-adjusted discounted expected returns over an infinite future? There is no empirical support for the idea. Indeed, research suggests that the models perform very poorly.
Economists may object that the field has moved on, using more sophisticated models that include more players with heterogeneous behaviors. This is a feint. It isn’t true of the vast majority of research.
Why does the profession want so desperately to hang on to the models? I see two possibilities. Maybe they do capture some deep understanding about how the economy works, an “if, then” relationship so hard to grasp that the world’s financial firms with their smart people and vast resources haven’t yet been able to figure out how to profit from it. I suppose that is conceivable.
More likely, economists find the models useful not in explaining reality, but in telling nice stories that fit with established traditions and fulfill the crucial goal of getting their work published in leading academic journals. With mathematical rigor, the models ensure that the stories follow certain cherished rules. Individual behavior, for example, must be the result of optimizing calculation, and all events must eventually converge toward a benign equilibrium in which all markets clear.
A creative economist colleague of mine told me that his papers have often been rejected from leading journals not for being implausible or for conflicting with the data, but with a simple comment: “This is not an equilibrium model.”
Knowledge really is power. I know of at least one financial firm in London that has a team of meteorologists running a bank of supercomputers to gain a small edge over others in identifying emerging weather patterns. Their models help them make good profits in the commodities markets. If economists’ DSGE models offered any insight into how economies work, they would be used in the same way. That they are not speaks volumes.
Markets, of course, aren’t always wise. They do make mistakes. Maybe we’ll find out a few years from now that the macroeconomists really do know better than all the smart people with “skin in the game.” I wouldn’t bet on it.
****
In 1986, when the space shuttle Challenger exploded 73 seconds after takeoff, investors immediately dumped the stock of manufacturer Morton Thiokol Inc., which made the O-rings that were eventually blamed for the disaster. With extraordinary wisdom, the global market had quickly rendered a verdict on what happened and why.
Economists often remind us that markets, by pooling information from diverse sources, do a wonderful job of valuing companies, ideas and inventions. So what does the market think about economic theory itself? The answer ought to be rather disconcerting.
Blogger Noah Smith recently did an informal survey to find out if financial firms actually use the “dynamic stochastic general equilibrium” models that encapsulate the dominant thinking about how the economy works. The result? Some do pay a little attention, because they want to predict the actions of central banks that use the models. In their investing, however, very few Wall Street firms find the DSGE models useful.
I heard pretty much the same story in recent meetings with 15 or so leaders of large London investment firms. None thought that the DSGE models offered insight into the workings of the economy.
This should come as no surprise to anyone who has looked closely at the models. Can an economy of hundreds of millions of individuals and tens of thousands of different firms be distilled into just one household and one firm, which rationally optimize their risk-adjusted discounted expected returns over an infinite future? There is no empirical support for the idea. Indeed, research suggests that the models perform very poorly.
Economists may object that the field has moved on, using more sophisticated models that include more players with heterogeneous behaviors. This is a feint. It isn’t true of the vast majority of research.
Why does the profession want so desperately to hang on to the models? I see two possibilities. Maybe they do capture some deep understanding about how the economy works, an “if, then” relationship so hard to grasp that the world’s financial firms with their smart people and vast resources haven’t yet been able to figure out how to profit from it. I suppose that is conceivable.
More likely, economists find the models useful not in explaining reality, but in telling nice stories that fit with established traditions and fulfill the crucial goal of getting their work published in leading academic journals. With mathematical rigor, the models ensure that the stories follow certain cherished rules. Individual behavior, for example, must be the result of optimizing calculation, and all events must eventually converge toward a benign equilibrium in which all markets clear.
A creative economist colleague of mine told me that his papers have often been rejected from leading journals not for being implausible or for conflicting with the data, but with a simple comment: “This is not an equilibrium model.”
Knowledge really is power. I know of at least one financial firm in London that has a team of meteorologists running a bank of supercomputers to gain a small edge over others in identifying emerging weather patterns. Their models help them make good profits in the commodities markets. If economists’ DSGE models offered any insight into how economies work, they would be used in the same way. That they are not speaks volumes.
Markets, of course, aren’t always wise. They do make mistakes. Maybe we’ll find out a few years from now that the macroeconomists really do know better than all the smart people with “skin in the game.” I wouldn’t bet on it.
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