Anyone who has read this blog consistently knows that I've written on and off about an important developing body of work showing how algorithms -- closely linked to Google's PageRank algorithm -- could be used to greatly increase transparency surrounding issues of systemic risk. The systemic risk linked to any one bank or even to any single financial transaction could be made apparent to everyone; call it "radical transparency." Coupled with other mechanisms, such transparency could provide a route to making the system safer on is own, through normal economic self organization. The idea, in essence, is to use computation to give everyone in the market the information they need to make better choices.
I've written about this
here,
here and most recently
here. I've just put a kind of
short summary article of all this up at Medium.com. But I'd also like to just quote some of the nice discussion from the most recent paper of Stefan Thurner and Sebastian Poledna. I think they describe the idea with beautiful clarity; so here's a whole big section. After describing various ideas currently under consideration for dealing with Too Big to Fail and systemic risk more generally, they note that..
No
matter how well intended these developments might be, they miss the
central point about the nature of SR, and might not be suitable to
improve stability of the financial system in a sustainable way. SR is
tightly related to the network structure of
financial assets and liabilities in
a financial system. Management of SR is essentially a matter of
re-structuring financial networks such that the probability of
cascading failure is reduced, or ideally eliminated.
Credit
risk is the risk that a borrower will default on a given debt by
failing to make the full pre-specified re-payments. It is usually
seen as a risk that emerges between two counterparties once they
engage in a financial transaction. The lender is the sole bearer of
credit risk, and figures the likelihood of failed repayments into a
risk premium. Lenders usually charge higher interest rates to
borrowers that are more likely to default (risk-based pricing).
Credit risk is relatively well understood, and can be mitigated
through a number methods and techniques [18].
The Basle accords provide an extensive framework dealing foremost
with the mitigation of credit risk [19–21].
When
two counterparties are part of a financial system, for example as
nodes in a financial network, the situation changes, and their
transaction may affect the financial system as a whole. The lender no
more is the sole bearer of credit risk, nor does credit risk depend
on the financial conditions of the borrower alone. The impact of a
default of the borrower is no longer limited to the lender, but it
may affect the other creditors of the lender (who also lend to the
same borrower) as well as their creditors, and so on. Similarly, the
lender is not only vulnerable to a default of the borrower but also
to defaults from all debtors of that borrower as well as their
debtors, etc. In financial networks credit risk loses the local
character between two counterparties, and becomes systemic.
SR
is the risk that the financial system as a whole or a large fraction
of it can no longer perform its function as a credit provider and
collapses. SR is a result of the network nature of financial
transactions and liabilities in the financial system. It unfolds as
secondary cascades of credit defaults, triggered by credit defaults
between individual counterparties. These cascades can potentially
wipe out the financial system by a de-leveraging cascade [22–29].
It is obvious that lenders have a strong incentive to mitigate credit
risk. In the case of SR the situation is less clear, since the
loss-bearers will in general not be directly involved in those
transactions that trigger systemic damage. It is not obvious which
players in the financial system have a true interest to mitigate SR.
Management of SR is foremost in the public interest.
It
is important to note that SR spreads by lending. If a systemically
risky node lends to a systemically non-risky one, the later inherits
SR from the risky node, since if the non-risky borrower should (for
whatever reason) not repay the loan, the risky node would trigger
systemic damage. In this sense SR spreads from the risky through
lending.
SR
is predominantly a network property of liability networks. Different
financial network topologies will have different probabilities for
systemic collapse, given the link density and the financial
conditions of nodes being the same. The management of SR becomes a
technical problem of managing the network topology of financial
networks. The goal is to do this in a way that does neither reduce
the credit provision capacity, nor the transaction volume of the
financial system. Data on the topology of credit networks is
available to many central banks. Several studies on historical data
show typical scale-free connectivity patterns in liability networks
[30–35], including overnight markets [36], and financial flows
[37]. As a network property, SR can be quantified by using
networkmetrics [38, 39]. In particular a relative risk measure
(DebtRank) can be assigned to all nodes in a financial network that
specifies the fraction of SR they contribute to the system
(institution- or node-specific SR) [39]. As shown later, it is
natural to extend the notion of node-specific SR to individual
liabilities between two counterparties
(liability-specific SR), and to individual transactions
(transaction-specific SR).
The
central idea of this paper is to introduce an incentive structure in
form of a transaction tax that dynamically structures liability
networks such that SR is minimized. Since every transaction in a
financial network has an impact on the overall SR of a system, we
suggest a transaction
tax on all transactions between any two market participants that
increase the SR of the entire system. The size of the tax is
proportional to the SR contribution of the particular transaction.
Market participants looking for credit will try to avoid this tax by
looking for credit opportunities that do not increase SR and are thus
tax free. As a consequence the network arranges toward a topology
that, in combination with the financial conditions of individual
institutions, will lead to a defacto
elimination of SR,
meaning that cascading failures can no longer occur. In the spirit of
risk-based pricing as it is used for credit risk, here we propose a
systemic risk premium.
It was shown in [39] that SR can be drastically reduced by reducing
borrowing from
systemically risky
nodes. This is achieved by distributing SR evenly over the network
and by preventing the emergence of systemically super-risky nodes.
The mechanism works in a self-organized way: risky nodes reduce their
SR because they are blocked from lending, non-risky nodes become more
systemically risky through their lending. A SR premium encourages
borrowers to borrow from safer lenders (since the borrower pays the
tax). Further, lenders have an incentive to become systemically safe
so that no (or only little) SRT is added to their loan offers, and
they can offer competitive rates. Since mitigation of SR is foremost
in the public interest we propose to charge a systemic risk tax as a
margin on every financial transaction that increases global SR.
Of course it will take lots of further thought to bring this into a practical form. But big ideas always start out small.