For
example, regulators need information to do their jobs, and cooperation
with those they regulate is a good way — probably the best way, and
almost certainly the easiest — to get it. They try to get along with
those they regulate, and that implies some give and take, some
understanding and sympathy. Moreover, as regulators needn’t always
remain regulators, prospects for later employment also play a role. A
while back, my Bloomberg Views colleague Megan McArdle summarized
the natural logic of regulatory capture. It’s not really surprising at
all (although it may be surprising that we don’t do more to at least try
to avoid it).
Economists
are rightly proud of this analysis. It’s an example where thinking
carefully about ordinary human behavior, as people do their best to meet
their goals and get along with one another, goes a long way to
explaining an important phenomenon. However, I suspect that economists
may be less happy , possibly even a little alarmed, with the direction
in which one of their tribe — Luigi Zingales of the University of
Chicago — suggests the analysis ought to be extended.
What
about economists themselves? Are they the free authors of their ideas,
or are they, like regulators, significantly influenced in their thinking
by their interactions with business interests? Zingales suggests
the latter — and argues that we should, therefore, consider economists’
views with considerable skepticism. Overall, he concludes, the
profession and its publications most likely display a significant
pro-business and pro-markets bias, because many economists are captured.
Read the whole thing at Medium.com.