A way to fight your traffic tickets. The paper was awarded a special prize of $400 that the author did not have to pay to the state of California.
Inspiration from physics for thinking about economics, finance and social systems
Thursday, April 19, 2012
Physics proof of innocence
In the category of unimportant but highly amusing, I think many will enjoy this very short paper written by a physicist in California. It was apparently offered, successfully, as proof of his innocence in a traffic case in which he was accused of running a red light. Based on three simple and plausible assumptions, he demonstrates that the perceiving officer must have been deceived. As the author describes the work:
Wednesday, April 4, 2012
Still here everyone...
Sorry I haven't managed to post anything now for quite some time. All the result of lots of travel to various scientific meetings -- including one fascinating event on non-equilibrium economics -- and a MAD effort to get my book done on time. Deadline is effectively NOW!!!!!
So I haven't been able to afford any time to blog. But I will be posting more soon. And I have Bloomberg pieces appearing once a month (with one due out now in the next couple of days).
Meanwhile, Satajit Das has an excellent deconstruction of a recent article in The Economist that could (may?) have been written by the financial industry itself, arguing why financial innovation is indeed such a wonderful thing, making the world more prosperous, stable, etc (have you heard that before?).
So I haven't been able to afford any time to blog. But I will be posting more soon. And I have Bloomberg pieces appearing once a month (with one due out now in the next couple of days).
Meanwhile, Satajit Das has an excellent deconstruction of a recent article in The Economist that could (may?) have been written by the financial industry itself, arguing why financial innovation is indeed such a wonderful thing, making the world more prosperous, stable, etc (have you heard that before?).
Tuesday, March 6, 2012
"Unemployment is an illusion and recessions are voluntary"
An illuminating speech by Paul Krugman:
Read the whole thing.
... I assume that most of those hearing or reading this speech at all closely are aware of the great divide that emerged in macroeconomics in the 1970s. For those who aren’t familiar with the story: in the 1930s Keynesian economics emerged as a response to depression, and by the 1950s it had come to dominate the field. There was, however, an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with that style of modeling, not so much because it fell short empirically as because it seemed intellectually incomplete. In “normal” economics we assume that prices rise or fall to match supply with demand. In Keynesian macroeconomics, however, one simply assumes that wages and perhaps prices too don’t fall in the face of high unemployment, or at least fall only slowly.
Why make this assumption? Well, because it’s what we see in reality – as confirmed once again by the experience of peripheral European countries, Portugal included, where wage declines have so far been modest even in the face of very high unemployment. But that’s an unsatisfying answer, and it was only natural that economists would try to find some deeper explanation.
The trouble is that finding that deeper explanation is hard. Keynes offered some plausible speculations that were as much sociological and psychological as purely economic – which is not to say that there’s anything wrong with invoking such factors. Modern “New Keynesians” have come up with stories in terms of the cost of changing prices, the desire of many firms to attract quality workers by paying a premium, and more. But one has to admit that it’s all pretty ad hoc; it’s more a matter of offering excuses, or if you prefer, possible rationales, for an empirical observation that we probably wouldn’t have predicted if we didn’t know it was there.
This, understandably, wasn’t satisfying to many economists. So there developed an alternative school of thought, which basically argued that the apparent “stickiness” of wages and prices in the face of unemployment was an optical illusion. Initially the story ran in terms of imperfect information; later it became a story about “real” shocks, in which unemployment was actually voluntary; that was the real business cycle approach.
And so we got the division of macroeconomics. On one side there was “saltwater” economics – people, who in America tended to be in coastal universities, who continued to view Keynes as broadly right, even though they couldn’t offer a rigorous justification for some of their assumptions. On the other side was “freshwater” – people who tended to be in inland US universities, and who went for logically complete models even if they seemed very much at odds with lived experience.
Obviously I don’t believe any of the freshwater stories, and indeed find them wildly implausible. But economists will have different ideas, and it’s OK if some of them are ones I or others dislike.
What’s not OK is what actually happened, which is that freshwater economics became a kind of cult, ignoring and ridiculing any ideas that didn’t fit its paradigm. This started very early; by 1980 Robert Lucas, one of the founders of the school, wrote approvingly of how people would giggle and whisper when facing a Keynesian. What’s remarkable about that is that this was all based on the presumption that freshwater logic would provide a plausible, workable alternative to Keynes – a presumption that was not borne out by anything that had happened in the 1970s. And in fact it never happened: over time, freshwater economics kept failing the test of empirical validity, and responded by downgrading the importance of evidence.
Read the whole thing.
Monday, March 5, 2012
Microfoundations -- fact and fiction
UPDATE AT THE END
I generally try not to write about things I know almost nothing about, but here goes. Take everything that follows here as a kind of "thinking out loud" -- a struggle to put into words my thoughts about some apparently odd ideas in macroeconomics. I say "apparently" because I don't know enough to be sure. Maybe they are all very sensible. I would greatly appreciate any further insight from anyone out there who knows.
The idea puzzling me is "microfoundations." As I understand it, the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics, linked to the names Robert Lucas, Edward Prescott, Thomas Sargent and others, demanded that macroeconomic theories shouldn't just be built as coarse-grained effective theories operating at the macroscale and written in terms of macroscopic variables such as inflation, unemployment, etc. Rather, a good theory henceforth was to link macroeconomic outcomes back to the behaviour of the individual agents in an economy, i.e. to their microeconomics behaviour. Such as theory would have "microfoundations."
To my physicist mind, this seems entirely sensible, so far. A difficult project, no doubt but sensible. By analogy, of course, this just seems like the effort to derive thermodynamics (a macroscopic theory) from the underlying behaviours of individual particles, which is the project of statistical mechanics. Deriving theories at higher levels from behaviours at lower levels is, when possible, a natural scientific project -- it offers unification or, if it can't be carried through, points to problem areas from which new ideas are likely to come.
Now, I have also read that much of the impetus for the rational expectations movement was the famous Lucas Critique which, if I understand it correctly, says that you can't reliably base policy interventions on simple regularities observed in macroeconomic data (a historically observed tradeoff between unemployment and inflation, for example). That regularity existed, after all, in the context of the policies prevailing in the past. Change the policies and those changes, by influencing the way people act and anticipate the future, may well strongly change or destroy the regularity on which you had based your plans. Again, plausible and sensible, it seems to me.
So, I can see the attraction of theories with microfoundations -- theories, that is, giving a plausible account of how macroeconomic reality emerges out of the micro reality and actual behaviour of millions of people and firms in interaction.
Now my puzzlement. As far as can tell, the idea of "microfoundations" as actually used in macroeconomics isn't quite how I described it above, i.e. seeking to base macro theory on a plausible account of the behaviour of individuals. Rather, in economics (through the work of Lucas) it has come to mean theories in which individuals and firms are hyperrational optimizers of their utility over a span of time (they solve a complicated optimization problem over their lifetime). This no longer seems so plausible, and on this point, a commenter from Mark Thoma's blog captures my feelings on this quite clearly:
Again, I'm not an expert on this. But I see this kind of argument breaking out over and over among economists. I often think I must have it wrong, so please if I do, someone let me know.
UPDATE
While writing the above, I happened to find and read a couple of things that clarified matters quite a bit for me. My take seems to be shared by economists as well, although I'm not sure the few things I read are representative. First, Maarten Janssen of the Tinbergen Institute published an excellent short review of the idea of microfoundations in 2008. He describes the history, but notes that key criticisms of the idea do center in the "plausibility" of the rational expectations approach. That is, including expectations in macromodels is sensible, but everything depends on how you include them:
I think much the same point of view is expressed by Michael Woodford, himself a big name in macro modelling. In a response to an essay by John Kay critical of modern macroeconomics and its unrealistic assumptions, Woodford in a roundabout way eventually says, well, yes, I agree:
So I feel that my suspicions and objections aren't misplaced, despite my vast ignorance. One other excellent article I recommend is this one from 2011 in which Woodford details the history of modern macroeconomics over the past century. Nothing I've read has given such a complete and clearly explained exposition, while it seems being balanced along the way (or so it seems, to my physicist's eyes).
UPDATE
Ole Rogeberg kindly let pointed me to this post by economist Noah Smith who makes some of the same points -- but from the position of someone with far economics domain knowledge than myself.
I generally try not to write about things I know almost nothing about, but here goes. Take everything that follows here as a kind of "thinking out loud" -- a struggle to put into words my thoughts about some apparently odd ideas in macroeconomics. I say "apparently" because I don't know enough to be sure. Maybe they are all very sensible. I would greatly appreciate any further insight from anyone out there who knows.
The idea puzzling me is "microfoundations." As I understand it, the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics, linked to the names Robert Lucas, Edward Prescott, Thomas Sargent and others, demanded that macroeconomic theories shouldn't just be built as coarse-grained effective theories operating at the macroscale and written in terms of macroscopic variables such as inflation, unemployment, etc. Rather, a good theory henceforth was to link macroeconomic outcomes back to the behaviour of the individual agents in an economy, i.e. to their microeconomics behaviour. Such as theory would have "microfoundations."
To my physicist mind, this seems entirely sensible, so far. A difficult project, no doubt but sensible. By analogy, of course, this just seems like the effort to derive thermodynamics (a macroscopic theory) from the underlying behaviours of individual particles, which is the project of statistical mechanics. Deriving theories at higher levels from behaviours at lower levels is, when possible, a natural scientific project -- it offers unification or, if it can't be carried through, points to problem areas from which new ideas are likely to come.
Now, I have also read that much of the impetus for the rational expectations movement was the famous Lucas Critique which, if I understand it correctly, says that you can't reliably base policy interventions on simple regularities observed in macroeconomic data (a historically observed tradeoff between unemployment and inflation, for example). That regularity existed, after all, in the context of the policies prevailing in the past. Change the policies and those changes, by influencing the way people act and anticipate the future, may well strongly change or destroy the regularity on which you had based your plans. Again, plausible and sensible, it seems to me.
So, I can see the attraction of theories with microfoundations -- theories, that is, giving a plausible account of how macroeconomic reality emerges out of the micro reality and actual behaviour of millions of people and firms in interaction.
Now my puzzlement. As far as can tell, the idea of "microfoundations" as actually used in macroeconomics isn't quite how I described it above, i.e. seeking to base macro theory on a plausible account of the behaviour of individuals. Rather, in economics (through the work of Lucas) it has come to mean theories in which individuals and firms are hyperrational optimizers of their utility over a span of time (they solve a complicated optimization problem over their lifetime). This no longer seems so plausible, and on this point, a commenter from Mark Thoma's blog captures my feelings on this quite clearly:
His point seems to me very well put -- if "microfoundations" as currently interpreted don't give foundations to anything, then a theory having them has no advantage. Theories with microfoundations (as interpreted in this odd sense) have no more claim to relevance than anything else. Indeed, we might say they are even worse as they are almost certainly demonstrably inconsistent with real behaviour at the micro level.hrsaccount said...Microfoundations would be important if there were clear evidence that they represented the truth. For example, if there had been a series of experiments demonstrating that individuals are rational and make decisions so as to maximize some measurable quantity called utility, it would be important that macro models were consistent with this and the most direct way of ensuring that would be to incorporate rational utility-maximizing households into the model.
The fact is that there is no such evidence. Microeconomics is not based on empirical evidence, and the approach used in microeconomics has no special claim to the truth. So, leaving aside the fact that the way macroeconomics uses micro (i.e., in a way that many microeconomists don't approve, ignoring aggregation issues) there's no logical reason why macro needs to even be consistent with micro.
Again, I'm not an expert on this. But I see this kind of argument breaking out over and over among economists. I often think I must have it wrong, so please if I do, someone let me know.
UPDATE
While writing the above, I happened to find and read a couple of things that clarified matters quite a bit for me. My take seems to be shared by economists as well, although I'm not sure the few things I read are representative. First, Maarten Janssen of the Tinbergen Institute published an excellent short review of the idea of microfoundations in 2008. He describes the history, but notes that key criticisms of the idea do center in the "plausibility" of the rational expectations approach. That is, including expectations in macromodels is sensible, but everything depends on how you include them:
The approaches discussed so far... all postulate rational behavior on the part of economic agents and some notion of equilibrium. If expectations are important, it is postulated that agents’ expectations concerning important variables coincide with the model’s predicted values concerning these same variables.And he mentions several branches of research criticizing this view and testing it, in particular, testing whether in a decentralized economy economic agents may learn over time to have expectations that are consistent with those that are assumed by the rational expectations hypothesis:
The general conclusion of this literature is that due to the feedback from expectations to economic behavior, the outcomes of an economic model with learning agents do not converge to the rational expectations solution. It then follows that the microfoundations literature mentioned so far has not really succeeded in deriving all macroeconomic propositions from fundamental hypotheses on the behavior of individual agents. The requirements of methodological individualism have thus not been satisfied by the microfoundations literature that has pre-dominantly presumed that individuals behave rationally...I cannot say I'm surprised. So we're left with theories that only go one short step toward the idea of microfoundations, and, in my view, can't claim they have given microfoundations to anything -- the use of the word in these models is totally unwarranted, and I think way overstates what they achieve.
I think much the same point of view is expressed by Michael Woodford, himself a big name in macro modelling. In a response to an essay by John Kay critical of modern macroeconomics and its unrealistic assumptions, Woodford in a roundabout way eventually says, well, yes, I agree:
It has been standard for at least the past three decades to use models in which not only does the model give a complete description of a hypothetical world, and not only is this description one in which outcomes follow from rational behavior on the part of the decision makers in the model, but the decision makers in the model are assumed to understand the world in exactly the way it is represented in the model. More precisely, in making predictions about the consequences of their actions (a necessary component of an accounting for their behavior in terms of rational choice), they are assumed to make exactly the predictions that the model implies are correct (conditional on the information available to them in their personal situation).This postulate of “rational expectations,” as it is commonly though rather misleadingly known, is the crucial theoretical assumption behind such doctrines as “efficient markets” in asset pricing theory and “Ricardian equivalence” in macroeconomics. It is often presented as if it were a simple consequence of an aspiration to internal consistency in one’s model and/or explanation of people’s choices in terms of individual rationality, but in fact it is not a necessary implication of these methodological commitments. It does not follow from the fact that one believes in the validity of one’s own model and that one believes that people can be assumed to make rational choices that they must be assumed to make the choices that would be seen to be correct by someone who (like the economist) believes in the validity of the predictions of that model. Still less would it follow, if the economist herself accepts the necessity of entertaining the possibility of a variety of possible models, that the only models that she should consider are ones in each of which everyone in the economy is assumed to understand the correctness of that particular model, rather than entertaining beliefs that might (for example) be consistent with one of the other models in the set that she herself regards as possibly correct.
So I feel that my suspicions and objections aren't misplaced, despite my vast ignorance. One other excellent article I recommend is this one from 2011 in which Woodford details the history of modern macroeconomics over the past century. Nothing I've read has given such a complete and clearly explained exposition, while it seems being balanced along the way (or so it seems, to my physicist's eyes).
UPDATE
Ole Rogeberg kindly let pointed me to this post by economist Noah Smith who makes some of the same points -- but from the position of someone with far economics domain knowledge than myself.
Wednesday, February 15, 2012
How markets become efficient (answer: they don't)
A staggering amount of effort has been spent -- and wasted -- exploring the idea of market efficiency. The notoriously malleable efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) claims (in its weakest form) that markets are "information efficient" -- market movements are unpredictable because smart investors keep them that way. They should quickly -- even, "instantaneously" in some statements -- pounce on any predictable pattern in the market, and by profiting will act to wipe out that pattern.
I've written too many times (here, here, here, for example) about the masses of evidence against this idea. It's not that predictable patterns don't attract investors who often act in ways that tend to wipe out those patterns through arbitrage. Part of the problem is that investors often act in ways that amplify the pattern (following trends, for example). Moreover, there are fundamental limits to arbitrage -- "the markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent." Still, the EMH stumbles onward like a zombie -- dead, proven incorrect and misleading, yet still taking center place in the way many people think of markets.
I found an illuminating new perspective on the matter in this recent paper by Doyne Farmer and Spyros Skouras, which explore analogies between finance and ecology. This analogy is itself deeply suggestive. They note, for example, how the interactions between hedge funds can be useful viewed in ecological terms -- funds sometimes act as direct competitors (the profits of one reducing opportunities for another), and in other cases as predator and prey or as symbiotic partners. But I want to look specifically at an effort they make to give a rough estimate of the timescale over which the actions of sophisticated arbitragers might reasonably be expected to wipe out a new predictable pattern in the market. That is, if the market for whatever reason is temporarily inefficient -- showing a predictable pattern -- how quickly should it be returned to efficiency? How long is the time to relaxation that the EMH claims is "instantaneous" or close to it?
The gist of their idea is very simple. Before you can exploit a predictable pattern, you first have to identify it. If you're going to invest money trading against it, you need to be fairly sure you've identified a real pattern, not just a statistical fluke. If you're going to invest somebody else's money, you have to convince them. This takes some time. The stronger the pattern, the more it stands out and the less time it should take to be sure. Weaker signals will be hidden by more noise, and reliable identification will take longer. Looking at how much time it should take to get good statistics should give an order of magnitude of how long a pattern should persist before any smart investor can begin reliably trading against it and (perhaps) erasing it.
Here's the specific argument, expressed using the Sharpe ratio (ratio of expected return to standard deviation of a strategy exploiting the pattern):
This makes obvious intuitive sense. If S is very large, making the pattern obvious, more deterministic and easier to exploit, then the time over which it might be expected to vanish is smaller. Truly obvious patterns can be expected to vanish quickly. But if S is small, the timescale for identification and exploitation grows.
As Farmer and Skouras note, successful investment strategies often have Sharpe ratios of about S = 1, so this gives a result of about 10 years. [This is the result if one makes the analysis on an annual timescale, with the Sharpe ratio calculated on a yearly basis. If we're talking about fast algorithmic trading, then the analysis takes place on a shorter timescale.]
So, 10 years is the order of magnitude estimate -- which is a rather peculiar interpretation of the word "instantaneous." Perhaps that word should be replaced in the EMH with "very slowly," although that somewhat dampens the appeal of the idea: "The EMH asserts that sophisticated investors will very slowly identify and exploit any inefficiencies in the market, tending the erase those inefficiencies over a few decades or so." Given that new inefficiencies can be expected the arise in the mean time, you might as well call this more plausible hypothesis the PIMH: the perpetually inefficient markets hypothesis.
And their estimate, Farmer and Skouras point out, is actually optimistic:
All in all, this way of estimating the time for relaxation back to the "efficient equilibrium" suggests that the relaxation is anything but fast, and often very slow. The EMH may be right that there likely aren't any obvious patterns, but more subtle predictable patterns will likely persist for long periods of time, even while they present real profit opportunities. The market is not in equilibrium. And with no mechanism to prevent them, new predictable patterns and "inefficiencies" should be emerging all the time.
I've written too many times (here, here, here, for example) about the masses of evidence against this idea. It's not that predictable patterns don't attract investors who often act in ways that tend to wipe out those patterns through arbitrage. Part of the problem is that investors often act in ways that amplify the pattern (following trends, for example). Moreover, there are fundamental limits to arbitrage -- "the markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent." Still, the EMH stumbles onward like a zombie -- dead, proven incorrect and misleading, yet still taking center place in the way many people think of markets.
I found an illuminating new perspective on the matter in this recent paper by Doyne Farmer and Spyros Skouras, which explore analogies between finance and ecology. This analogy is itself deeply suggestive. They note, for example, how the interactions between hedge funds can be useful viewed in ecological terms -- funds sometimes act as direct competitors (the profits of one reducing opportunities for another), and in other cases as predator and prey or as symbiotic partners. But I want to look specifically at an effort they make to give a rough estimate of the timescale over which the actions of sophisticated arbitragers might reasonably be expected to wipe out a new predictable pattern in the market. That is, if the market for whatever reason is temporarily inefficient -- showing a predictable pattern -- how quickly should it be returned to efficiency? How long is the time to relaxation that the EMH claims is "instantaneous" or close to it?
The gist of their idea is very simple. Before you can exploit a predictable pattern, you first have to identify it. If you're going to invest money trading against it, you need to be fairly sure you've identified a real pattern, not just a statistical fluke. If you're going to invest somebody else's money, you have to convince them. This takes some time. The stronger the pattern, the more it stands out and the less time it should take to be sure. Weaker signals will be hidden by more noise, and reliable identification will take longer. Looking at how much time it should take to get good statistics should give an order of magnitude of how long a pattern should persist before any smart investor can begin reliably trading against it and (perhaps) erasing it.
Here's the specific argument, expressed using the Sharpe ratio (ratio of expected return to standard deviation of a strategy exploiting the pattern):
This makes obvious intuitive sense. If S is very large, making the pattern obvious, more deterministic and easier to exploit, then the time over which it might be expected to vanish is smaller. Truly obvious patterns can be expected to vanish quickly. But if S is small, the timescale for identification and exploitation grows.
As Farmer and Skouras note, successful investment strategies often have Sharpe ratios of about S = 1, so this gives a result of about 10 years. [This is the result if one makes the analysis on an annual timescale, with the Sharpe ratio calculated on a yearly basis. If we're talking about fast algorithmic trading, then the analysis takes place on a shorter timescale.]
So, 10 years is the order of magnitude estimate -- which is a rather peculiar interpretation of the word "instantaneous." Perhaps that word should be replaced in the EMH with "very slowly," although that somewhat dampens the appeal of the idea: "The EMH asserts that sophisticated investors will very slowly identify and exploit any inefficiencies in the market, tending the erase those inefficiencies over a few decades or so." Given that new inefficiencies can be expected the arise in the mean time, you might as well call this more plausible hypothesis the PIMH: the perpetually inefficient markets hypothesis.
And their estimate, Farmer and Skouras point out, is actually optimistic:
We should stress that this estimate is based on idealized assumptions, such as log-normal returns – heavy tails, autocorrelations, and other effects will tend to make the timescale even longer.... As a given inefficiency is exploited, it will become weaker and the Sharpe ratio of investment strategies associated with it drops. As the Sharpe ratio becomes smaller the fluctuations in its returns become bigger, which can generate uncertainty about whether or not the strategy is still viable. This slows down the approach to inefficiency even more.Of course, as I mentioned above, this analysis depends on timescale. Take t in years and we're thinking about predictable patterns emerging on the usual investment horizon of a year or longer, patterns exploited by hedge funds and mutual funds of the more traditional (not high frequency) kind. Here we see that the time to expect predictable patterns to be wiped out is very long indeed. If 10 years is the order of magnitude, then it's likely some of these patterns persist for several decades -- getting up to the time of a typical investing career. Hardcore supporters of the EMH should learn to speak more honestly: "We have every reason to expect that predictable market inefficiencies should be wiped out fairly quickly, at least on the timescale of a human investment career."
All in all, this way of estimating the time for relaxation back to the "efficient equilibrium" suggests that the relaxation is anything but fast, and often very slow. The EMH may be right that there likely aren't any obvious patterns, but more subtle predictable patterns will likely persist for long periods of time, even while they present real profit opportunities. The market is not in equilibrium. And with no mechanism to prevent them, new predictable patterns and "inefficiencies" should be emerging all the time.
Labels:
dynamics,
ecoloy,
efficient markets,
evolution,
relaxation,
strategies
Tuesday, February 14, 2012
What's going on in Greece
Numerian, one of the most insightful financial bloggers I know, gets to the bottom of the markets' surge in the wake of the Greek passage of the new "austerity" measures:
For now, stock markets are happy because they get their periodic injection of heroin – oops, make that “liquidity” – to keep the game going. The game is the one we have all lived through our whole lives – the one where capitalism continues to grow by taking on more and more debt, until now every country is at the point where only the government is big enough to take on the enormous amounts of new debt necessary to keep paying principal and interest on the old debt. At least some countries are: the United States, the UK, Germany, France. Greece of course lost that privilege several years ago, and now even big borrowers like Italy are allowed into the markets only for very short term maturities.
The game, in short, is about over, choking to death on too much debt, kept on a resuscitator by politicians and central bankers who know the public has no way to stop them from raising trillions of dollars or euros with new bond issues. Only the market can stop an out-of-control debtor. Greece has found that out, Italy and Spain and Portugal are close to finding that out, and the UK and the United States are on the list, being no more virtuous than the Greeks. Once the government can no longer borrow, default in some form is inevitable, and austerity follows. The Greeks have austerity handed to them by the Germans; everyone else will be able to choose their own forms of austerity, as different economic and social forces fight with each other in a country that has run out of borrowing capacity and must live off the taxes it is able to raise.
If the stock market had a long term view, it would think about these things. It would look at Greece as a combination horror story and warning sign. Instead, the stock market lives for the day only, and for now the debt binge continues, and the fix of easy credit is being pumped into the financial system once more. Let the celebrations continue.
Monday, February 13, 2012
Approaching the singularity -- in global finance
In a new paper on trends in high-frequency trading, Neil Johnson and colleagues note that:
We may be getting close. If Johnson and his colleagues are correct, the markets are already showing signs of having already made a transition into a machine-dominated phase in which humans have little control.
Most readers here will probably know about futurist Ray Kurzweil's prediction of the approaching "singularity" -- the idea that as our technology becomes increasingly intelligent it will at some point create self-sustaining positive feedback loops that drive explosively faster science and development leading to a kind of super-intelligence residing in machines. Humans will be out of the loop and left behind. Given that so much of the future vision of computing now centers on bio-inspired computing -- computers that operate more along the lines of living organisms, being able do things like self-repair and adaptation, true reproduction, etc, -- it's easy to imagine this super-intelligence again ultimately being strongly biological in form, while also exploiting technologies that earlier evolution was unable to harness (superconductivity, quantum computing, etc.). In that case -- again, if you believe this conjecture has some merit -- it could turn out ironically that all of our computing technology will act as a kind of mid-wife aiding a transition from Homo sapiens to some future non-human but super-intelligent species.
But forget that. Think singularity, but in the smaller world of the markets. Johnson and his colleagues ask the question of whether today's high-frequency markets are moving toward a boundary of speed where human intervention and control is effectively impossible:
In the period from 2006-2011, they found (looking at many stocks on multiple exchanges) that there were about 18,500 specific episodes in which markets, in less than 1.5 seconds, either 1. ticked down at least 10 times in a row, dropping by more than 0.8% or 2. ticked up at least 10 times in a row, rising by more than 0.8%. The figure below shows two typical events, a crash and a spike (upward), both lasting only 25 ms.

Apparently, these very brief and momentary downward crashes or upward spikes -- the authors refer to them as "fractures" or "Black Swan events" -- are about equally likely. And they become more likely as one goes to shorter time intervals:
Ok. Now for the punchline -- an effort to understand how this transition might happen. In my last blog post I wrote about the Minority Game -- a simple model of a market in which adaptive agents attempt to profit by using a variety of different strategies. It reproduces the realistic statistics of real markets, despite its simplicity. I expect that some people may wonder if this model can really be useful in exploring real markets. If so, this new work by Johnson and colleagues offers a powerful example of how valuable the minority game can be in action.
Their hypothesis is that the observed transition in market dynamics below one second reflects "a new fundamental transition from a mixed phase of humans and machines, in which humans have time to assess information and act, to an ultrafast all-machine phase in which machines dictate price changes." They explore this in a model that...
Johnson and colleagues suggests that the transition between these regimes is just what shows up in the statistics around the one second threshold. They first argue that the regime for large α (many strategies per agent) should be associated with the trading regime above one second, where both people and machines take part. Why? As they suggest,
In contrast, they suggest that the sub one second regime should be associated the the α < 1 phase of the minority game:
The paper as a whole takes a bit of time to get your head around, but it is, I think, a beautiful example of how a simple model that explores some of the rich dynamics of how strategies interact in a market can give rise to some deep insights. The analysis suggests, first, that the high frequency markets have moved past "the singularity," their dynamics having become fundamentally different -- uncoupled from the control, or at least strong influence, of human trading. It also suggests, second, that the change in dynamics derives directly from the crowding of strategies that operate on very short timescales, this crowding caused by the need for relative simplicity in these strategies.
This kind of analysis really should have some bearing on the consideration of potential new regulations on HFT. But that's another big topic. Quite aside from practical matters, the paper shows how valuable perspectives and toy models like the minority game might be.
... a new dedicated transatlantic cable is being built just to shave 5 milliseconds off transatlantic communication times between US and UK traders, while a new purpose-built chip iX-eCute is being launched which prepares trades in 740 nanoseconds ...This just illustrates the technological arms race underway as firms try to out-compete each other to gain an edge through speed. None of the players in this market worries too much about what this arms race might mean for the longer term systemic stability of market; it's just race ahead and hope for the best. I've written before (here and here) about some analyses (notably from Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England) suggesting that this race is generally increasing market volatility and will likely lead to disaster in one form or another.
We may be getting close. If Johnson and his colleagues are correct, the markets are already showing signs of having already made a transition into a machine-dominated phase in which humans have little control.
Most readers here will probably know about futurist Ray Kurzweil's prediction of the approaching "singularity" -- the idea that as our technology becomes increasingly intelligent it will at some point create self-sustaining positive feedback loops that drive explosively faster science and development leading to a kind of super-intelligence residing in machines. Humans will be out of the loop and left behind. Given that so much of the future vision of computing now centers on bio-inspired computing -- computers that operate more along the lines of living organisms, being able do things like self-repair and adaptation, true reproduction, etc, -- it's easy to imagine this super-intelligence again ultimately being strongly biological in form, while also exploiting technologies that earlier evolution was unable to harness (superconductivity, quantum computing, etc.). In that case -- again, if you believe this conjecture has some merit -- it could turn out ironically that all of our computing technology will act as a kind of mid-wife aiding a transition from Homo sapiens to some future non-human but super-intelligent species.
But forget that. Think singularity, but in the smaller world of the markets. Johnson and his colleagues ask the question of whether today's high-frequency markets are moving toward a boundary of speed where human intervention and control is effectively impossible:
The downside of society’s continuing drive toward larger, faster, and more interconnected socio-technical systems such as global financial markets, is that future catastrophes may be less easy to forsee and manage -- as witnessed by the recent emergence of financial flash-crashes. In traditional human-machine systems, real-time human intervention may be possible if the undesired changes occur within typical human reaction times. However,... in many areas of human activity, the quickest that someone can notice such a cue and physically react, is approximately 1000 milliseconds (1 second)Obviously, most trading now happens much faster than this. Is this worrying? With the authors, let's look at the data.
In the period from 2006-2011, they found (looking at many stocks on multiple exchanges) that there were about 18,500 specific episodes in which markets, in less than 1.5 seconds, either 1. ticked down at least 10 times in a row, dropping by more than 0.8% or 2. ticked up at least 10 times in a row, rising by more than 0.8%. The figure below shows two typical events, a crash and a spike (upward), both lasting only 25 ms.
Apparently, these very brief and momentary downward crashes or upward spikes -- the authors refer to them as "fractures" or "Black Swan events" -- are about equally likely. And they become more likely as one goes to shorter time intervals:
... our data set shows a far greater tendency for these financial fractures to occur, within a given duration time-window, as we move to smaller timescales, e.g. 100-200ms has approximately ten times more than 900-1000ms.But they also find something much more significant. They studied the distribution of these events by size, and considered if this distribution changes when looking at events taking place on different timescales. The data suggests that it does. For times above about 0.8 seconds or so, the distribution closely fits a power law, in agreement with countless other studies of market returns on times of one second or longer. For times shorter than about 0.8 seconds, the distribution begins to depart from the power law form. (It's NOT that it becomes more Gaussian, but it does become something else that is not a power law.) The conclusion is that something significant happens in the market when we reach times going below 1 second -- roughly the timescale of human action.
Ok. Now for the punchline -- an effort to understand how this transition might happen. In my last blog post I wrote about the Minority Game -- a simple model of a market in which adaptive agents attempt to profit by using a variety of different strategies. It reproduces the realistic statistics of real markets, despite its simplicity. I expect that some people may wonder if this model can really be useful in exploring real markets. If so, this new work by Johnson and colleagues offers a powerful example of how valuable the minority game can be in action.
Their hypothesis is that the observed transition in market dynamics below one second reflects "a new fundamental transition from a mixed phase of humans and machines, in which humans have time to assess information and act, to an ultrafast all-machine phase in which machines dictate price changes." They explore this in a model that...
...considers an ecology of N heterogenous agents (machines and/or humans) who repeatedly compete to win in a competition for limited resources. Each agent possesses s > 1 strategies. An agent only participates if it has a strategy that has performed sufficiently well in the recent past. It uses its best strategy at a given timestep. The agents sit watching a common source of information, e.g. recent price movements encoded as a bit-string of length M, and act on potentially profitable patterns they observe.This is just the minority game as I described it a few days ago. One of the truly significant lessons emerging from its study is that we should expect markets to have two fundamentally distinct phases of dynamics depending on the parameter α=P/N, where P is the number of different past histories the agents can perceive, and N is the number of agents in the game. [P=2M if the agents use bit strings of length M in forming their strategies]. If α is small, then there are lots of players relative to the number of different market histories they can perceive. If α is big, then there are many different possible histories relative to only a few people. These two extremes lead to very different market behaviour.
Johnson and colleagues suggests that the transition between these regimes is just what shows up in the statistics around the one second threshold. They first argue that the regime for large α (many strategies per agent) should be associated with the trading regime above one second, where both people and machines take part. Why? As they suggest,
We associate this regime (see Fig. 3) with a market in which both humans and machines are dictating prices, and hence timescales above the transition (>1s), for these reasons: The presence of humans actively trading -- and hence their ‘free will’ together with the myriad ways in which they can manually override algorithms -- means that the effective number (i.e. α > 1). Moreover α > 1 implies m is large, hence there are more pieces of information available which suggests longer timescales... in this α > 1 regime, the average number of agents per strategy is less than 1, hence any crowding effects due to agents coincidentally using the same strategy will be small. This lack of crowding leads our model to predict that any large price movements arising for α > 1 will be rare and take place over a longer duration – exactly as observed in our data for timescales above 1000ms. Indeed, our model’s price output (e.g. Fig. 3, right-hand panel) reproduces the stylized facts associated with financial markets over longer timescales, including a power-law distribution.What they're getting at here is that crowding in the space of strategies, by creating strong correlations in the strategies of different agents, should tend to make large market movements more likely. After all, if lots of agents come to use the very same strategy, they will all trade the same way at the same time. In this regime above one second, with humans and machine, they suggests there shouldn't be much crowding; the dynamics here do give a power law distribution of movements, but it is what is found in all markets in this regime.
In contrast, they suggest that the sub one second regime should be associated the the α < 1 phase of the minority game:
Our association of the α < 1 regime with an all-machine phase is consistent with the fact that trading algorithms in the sub-second regime need to be executable extremely quickly and hence be relatively simple, without calling on much memory concerning past information: α < 1 regime with an all-machine phase is consistent with the fact that trading algorithms in the sub-second regime need to be executable extremely quickly and hence be relatively simple, without calling on much memory concerning past information: Hence M will be small, so the total number of strategies will be small and therefore... α < 1. Our model also predicts that the size distribution for the black swans in this ultrafast regime (α < 1) should not have a power law since changes of all sizes do not appear – this is again consistent with the results in Fig. 2.And...
Our model undergoes a transition around α = 1 to a regime characterized by significant strategy crowding and hence large fluctuations. The price output for α < 1 (Fig. 3, left-hand panel) shows frequent abrupt changes due to agents moving as unintentional groups into particular strategies. Our model therefore predicts a rapidly increasing number of ultrafast black swan events as we move to smaller α and hence smaller subsecond timescales – as observed in our data.The authors go on to quantify this transition in a little more detail. In particular, they calculate in the simple minority game model the standard deviation of the price fluctuations. In the regime α < 1 this turns out to be roughly proportional to the number N of agents in the market. In contrast, it goes in proportion only to the square root of N in the α > 1 regime. Hence, the model predicts a sharp increase in the size of market fluctuations when entering the machine dominated phase below one second.
The paper as a whole takes a bit of time to get your head around, but it is, I think, a beautiful example of how a simple model that explores some of the rich dynamics of how strategies interact in a market can give rise to some deep insights. The analysis suggests, first, that the high frequency markets have moved past "the singularity," their dynamics having become fundamentally different -- uncoupled from the control, or at least strong influence, of human trading. It also suggests, second, that the change in dynamics derives directly from the crowding of strategies that operate on very short timescales, this crowding caused by the need for relative simplicity in these strategies.
This kind of analysis really should have some bearing on the consideration of potential new regulations on HFT. But that's another big topic. Quite aside from practical matters, the paper shows how valuable perspectives and toy models like the minority game might be.
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